Book Review : The Concept of Injustice (Eric Heinze, Routledge, 2013) by Ball, Matthew J.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Ball, Matthew J. (2013) Book Review : The Concept of Injustice (Eric
Heinze, Routledge, 2013). Griffith Law Review, 22(2), pp. 546-547.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/72608/
c© Copyright 2013 [please consult the author]
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 
 
BOOK REVIEW 
The Concept of Injustice (Eric Heinze, Routledge, 2013, 
ISBN 978 0 415 63479 3, 218 pp) 
 
Review by Matthew Ball* 
Given the level of debate and theorising in Western thought on the topic of 
justice, it is curious that the concept of injustice has not attracted the same 
attention. While many schools of thought have sought to address various 
injustices, most define injustice solely as the opposite of their vision of a just 
society – it seems they have not been interested in exploring injustice per se. 
With this as a starting point, Eric Heinze’s The Concept of Injustice 
addresses this oversight and, by taking injustice itself as an object of 
analysis, adds a new dimension to these discussions. 
Heinze offers a rigorous critique of our common understandings of 
justice, suggesting that they are binarist – they use an apparent etymological 
link between the terms ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ to imply that these can be 
reduced to a mutually exclusive pair of concepts, with injustice being 
positioned as the opposite and negation of what is just. This is not only the 
case in theories of justice, but in ‘bipolar’ legal disputes or in hypothetical 
scenarios used to debate matters of justice, wherein complex issues are often 
simplified through a crude binary logic of winner and loser, just and unjust. 
Additionally, injustice is thought to arise simply because our attempts to 
bring about justice are not properly achieved: the theory is not implemented 
properly, or any injustice that is produced is only accidental. As a result of 
these assumptions, Heinze argues, any understanding of injustice is 
subordinated to a conceptually and etymologically prior justice. 
Heinze’s attempt to break away from these assumptions is compelling. He 
argues that if we are to understand injustice in itself, we could begin by 
recognising that injustice is an inevitable product of any attempt to bring about 
justice. In this view, injustice does not exist because of the negation, 
misapprehension or misapplication of whatever criteria we deem necessary to 
achieving justice, but because of the existence of such criteria per se. This 
becomes the cornerstone of his argument throughout the book, and while he 
discusses both the criteria of unity and measurement, his primary focus is on 
measurement. 
Measurement, Heinze argues, is at the centre of both justice and 
injustice. Many programmatic theories of justice (like those suggested by 
thinkers such as Locke, Kant, Mill, Rawls and Dworkin) are concerned with 
identifying the correct system of measurement that can be used to determine 
a just distribution of social goods. Meritocracy, for example, involves 
measuring one’s merit or achievements and comparing them to those of 
others. Distributive theories that seek a fairer distribution of social goods 
also require forms of measurement to achieve their aims. And many of the 
common maxims of justice – ‘from each according to their abilities, to each 
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according to their needs’ – rely on measurement. While most theories of 
justice condemn one system of measurement in order to replace it with 
another, Heinze suggests that it is the necessity of measurement as such 
within these theories that produces injustice. Every form of measurement, he 
argues, seeks to translate goods, qualities, contributions, and so on into 
commodities or numerical values so as to make them comparable and 
interchangeable – a process that always involves and produces contestation. 
Measurement therefore sits at the very origin of both justice and injustice – it 
would be impossible to produce justice without measurement, but it is 
equally impossible to avoid producing injustice through such measurement. 
Heinze’s argument is drawn not only from an examination of key thinkers 
in the Western canon, but also from in-depth readings of a handful of fictional 
works (particularly Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and Macbeth, 
Shakespeare and Middleton’s Timon of Athens and Pierre Corneille’s Le Cid), 
making the book a contribution to law and literature scholarship. These texts, he 
argues, offer a unique lens through which to understand questions of justice and 
injustice, given that they are not necessarily wedded to the binarist or legalistic 
frameworks that he critiques, and that would be present if he drew his sources 
from case law, legislation or ‘real’ legal issues. This selection of texts is novel 
and refreshing. 
However, such an in-depth analysis of these texts can distract the reader 
in at least three ways. First, at times it can seem that an in-depth knowledge 
of these literary texts is necessary in order to best understand and engage 
with the evidence Heinze uses to support his propositions. While he provides 
exhaustive detail, this can be distracting, and may not always serve to 
convince readers who lack a deeper understanding of these stories. This 
leads to the second potential distraction, which is that such exhaustive 
attention devoted to a few key texts can lead to the discussion of a number of 
examples that are frankly unnecessary. For example, when talking about 
measurement in one play, Heinze says that it is tempting to read ‘meat’ as 
‘mete’. Further, he proposes that the one-upmanship of Shakespearean 
insults in one context can also be seen as example of measurement and 
comparison. While his point is well made by the time that these examples 
are discussed, Heinze’s decision to include them can undermine the 
persuasiveness of his argument by giving the impression that it is somewhat 
stretched. This impression is also reinforced to some extent by the third 
potential distraction: such an in-depth reading of a select few texts begs the 
question why a broader diversity of examples were not used to illustrate the 
argument. There is no shortage of examples outside of literature (and the 
strictly legal sphere that the author was trying to avoid) that could have 
illustrated the broader relevance of the arguments made. This is particularly 
the case when the very topic analysed is as broad-ranging and widely 
relevant as injustice. 
These critiques aside, The Concept of Injustice makes a thought-
provoking contribution to debates about justice. Given that these debates are 
well-trodden ground within Western thought, Heinze is to be commended 
for such an original and engaging contribution. 
